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DIVERSITY DRIFT 
Jonathan P. Feingold* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Diversity may be under attack in the age of Trump, but higher 
education in America has its own diversity problem.  If mission 
statements and strategic plans offer any guidance, many of America’s 
colleges and universities actively value diversity.1  Yet even as calls 
for diversity grow, these calls far too often lack a clear and coherent 
normative anchor.  Institutions often seek “diversity” without first 
having done the work to define, precisely, why they want diversity, or 
to identify, concretely, what sorts of diversity will get them there. 
As a result, universities have become susceptible to diversity 
drift, whereby good intentions invite unintended—and at times, 
perverse—consequences.  Seemingly innocuous language (as simple 
as calls to hire and admit “diverse people”),2 for instance, risks 
reifying whiteness as an institutional baseline against which 
students and faculty of color are rendered perpetual outsiders.  And 
untethered to history, context, and power, calls for diversity can fall 
victim to false equivalencies that deny any principled distinction 
between those who would #TakeAKnee to honor Black lives and those 
who travel the college circuit to mock, demean, and insult. 
 
 *. Research Fellow, BruinX | Special Assistant to the Vice Chancellor, 
UCLA Equity, Diversity and Inclusion.  Jonathan Feingold holds a B.A. from 
Vassar College and a J.D. from UCLA School of Law.  
1. See, e.g., Regents Policy 4400: Policy on University of California Diversity 
Statement, UNIV. OF CAL., 
https://regents.universityofcalifornia.edu/governance/policies/4400.html (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2019); Diversity & Inclusion, UNIV. OF CONN., 
https://diversity.uconn.edu/# (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); Mission Statement, 
UNIV. OF OR., https://www.uoregon.edu/our-mission (last visited Feb. 18, 2019); 
Diversity, UNIV. OF TEX., https://www.utexas.edu/about/diversity (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2019). 
 2. See, e.g., Spencer Kornhaber, A Person Can’t Be ‘Diverse’, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/01/ava-
duvernay-oscars-so-white-diversity-academy-awards-language/429225/ 
(critiquing the Motion Picture Academy of America’s use of the phrase “diverse 
members”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3344783 
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II. DIVERSITY’S ORIGINS 
As troubling as it may be, the rise of diversity drift should not 
surprise us. This contemporary phenomenon has doctrinal roots in 
Regents of California v. Bakke,3 a 1978 decision that marked the 
Supreme Court’s first major engagement with affirmative action in 
higher education.  Allen Bakke, a white male who had been rejected 
from the UC Davis Medical School in consecutive years, argued that 
the school’s race-conscious admissions program violated his rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.4  
Justice Powell, who authored the controlling opinion, found for 
Bakke and struck down the challenged policy.  In so doing, Justice 
Powell rejected three rationales the Medical School had mobilized to 
defend its admissions program.5  Critically, however, he 
simultaneously embraced the Medical School’s final justification: the 
pursuit of student body diversity.6  Thus, even as Bakke proved fatal 
for the challenged policy, Justice Powell’s embrace of diversity left 
open the door for affirmative action beyond.  Indeed, as recently as 
2016, the Supreme Court upheld affirmative action at the University 
of Texas and reaffirmed the diversity rationale’s place within its equal 
protection jurisprudence.7 
Even if a pragmatic victory for affirmative action, Justice 
Powell’s vision of diversity came with baggage.  Specifically, Justice 
Powell divorced diversity from the anti-racist projects that only 
decades earlier had fueled the dismantling of state-sanctioned 
exclusion and subordination across sectors of American life.8  Instead, 
he advanced a market theory of diversity that neglected the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s egalitarian instincts and instead centered 
the First Amendment interests of predominately White institutions 
and the students they had historically served.9  This pivot was, by 
 
 3. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 4. Id. at 276–78.  Bakke also alleged that the Medical School’s admissions 
policy violated the California Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.  See id. 
 5. Id. at 306. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Fisher v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (“Fisher I confirmed 
that ‘the decision to pursue “the educational benefits that flow from student body 
diversity” is, in substantial measure, an academic judgment to which some, but 
not complete, judicial deference is proper.’”). 
 8. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–13.  See also Charles R. Lawrence III, Each 
Other’s Harvest: Diversity’s Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 770–71 (1997) 
(“[Grounding the diversity rationale in the First Amendment] constitutionalizes 
the power of a privileged educational establishment to determine what learning 
shall be valued and who shall be taught.”); Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381, 416 n.170, 442 (1998) (“Because academic freedom 
is a neutral principle favoring no particular substantive end, I do not believe it 
provides an adequate constitutional basis for the diversity rationale.”). 
 9. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (“Thus, in arguing that its universities must 
be accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the 
‘robust exchange of ideas,’ petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional 
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many accounts, politically savvy; by embracing an arguably shallow 
vision of diversity that valued difference for difference sake, Justice 
Powell offered a path to five votes on the Supreme Court and an 
avenue for institutions to maintain race-conscious admissions 
without implicating their own legacies of racial exclusion and 
marginalization.10 
III.  RESISTING DIVERSITY DRIFT 
Forty years later, the rhetoric of diversity appears entrenched 
within the lexicon of higher education.  For those committed to 
building more equitable and inclusive institutions, this should be 
viewed as progress.  But to realize such aspirations, institutions must 
break free from the conceptual confines of diversity bequeathed to us 
in Bakke.  As a point of departure, institutions should endeavor to 
understand their particular diversity projects through an 
intersectional lens that attends to, and is informed by, related 
institutional commitments such as equality and inclusion.11  The goal 
need not be a single, static, uncontested vision of diversity.  To the 
contrary, it may be vital—if not inevitable—for institutions to 
reanimate un-interrogated visions of diversity by speaking to local 
context, conflict, and history.  Ultimately, to guard against diversity 
drift, institutions would be wise to engage in an introspective project 
that anchors diversity to a normative foundation that centers those 
who have been, and remain, at the margins. 
This is a project that could take many forms, and I offer but one 
in this short essay.  Specifically, I invite institutions to center and 
celebrate the relationship between racial diversity and “equal 
university membership,” a concept I employ elsewhere to capture 
each university student’s interest in an equal opportunity to enjoy, 
regardless of her race, the full benefits of university membership.12  
 
interest, that of the First Amendment.”); Lewis H. LaRue, The Rhetoric of 
Powell's Bakke, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 43, 45 (1981). 
 10. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 1470, 1532 (2004) (“Even as he rejected a race-asymmetric or 
antisubordination framework for interpreting the presumption against racial 
classifications, Justice Powell offered the nation a master compromise in the 
concept of ‘diversity’ itself—a framework that would allow limited voluntary race-
conscious efforts at desegregation to continue, in a social form that would 
preserve the Constitution as a domain of neutral principles.”). 
 11. Consider, for instance, UCLA’s faculty hiring guide, which explores the 
related concepts of equity, diversity, and inclusion.  See UCLA EQUITY, DIVERSITY 
AND INCLUSION, SEARCHING FOR EXCELLENCE, EVIDENCE-BASED STRATEGIES FOR 
EQUITABLE AND INCLUSIVE FACULTY HIRING 4–6 (2018), 
https://ucla.app.box.com/v/searching-for-excellence (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). 
 12. See Jonathan Feingold, Hidden in Plain Sight: A More Compelling Case 
for Diversity, UTAH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (exploring the relationship 
between racial diversity and each student’s interest in equal university 
membership).   
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3344783 
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In other words, we should care about racial diversity, in part, because 
it promotes personal equality in the classroom. 
IV.  RETURNING TO THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CANON 
To appreciate the relationship between diversity and personal 
equality in the university, one need only return to Bakke.  To buttress 
his diversity rationale, Justice Powell drew heavily on the Harvard 
College Admissions Plan, a document that outlined how and why 
Harvard considered applicant race in its admissions process.  Justice 
Powell was so fond of the Harvard Plan that, in addition to quoting it 
at length, he appended the entire document to his opinion.13 
Mirroring Justice Powell’s first amendment framing, Harvard 
valued diversity, including racial diversity, because of its ability to 
promote the robust exchange of ideas in the classroom.14  Yet in ways 
that often escape standard accounts of Bakke, Harvard’s interest in 
diversity ran deeper.  Specifically, Harvard recognized that if it failed 
to admit a sufficient number of students of color, the few who it did 
admit might encounter an institutional environment that would 
deprive them of an education equal to their White peers.  Harvard 
explained: 
10 or 20 black students . . . might also create a sense of isolation 
among the black students themselves and thus make it more 
difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential. . . . 
[T]here is some relationship between numbers and achieving 
the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and 
between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for 
those students admitted.15 
This insight never penetrated Justice Powell’s core embrace of 
diversity and its attending benefits.  Nonetheless, it remains 
embedded in his opinion, and offers a point of departure for a more 
grounded and—to many—more normatively satisfying vision of 
diversity.  For institutions interested in fortifying and localizing 
Harvard’s instincts, there are two natural places to turn: social 
science and Supreme Court precedent. 
V.  THE SOCIAL SCIENCE 
There is good reason to take Harvard’s instincts seriously.16  In 
the years since Bakke, now well-established research on stereotype 
 
 13. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 321–24. 
 14. See id. 
 15. Id. at 323. 
16. Beyond the social science I discuss here, student testimony offers 
additional insight into the identity-contingent burdens that attend to severe 
underrepresentation in the university context.  See Brief of UCLA School of Law 
Students of Color as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 554405 (law students of 
color across four at University of California law schools detailed their experiences 
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threat and social identity threat reveal a clear link between 
institutional environments and a student’s university experience.17  
These two related, yet distinct phenomena broadly refer to the 
psychological threat that an individual experiences when she fears 
that she will be devalued or negatively stereotyped because of an 
identity she holds.18 
Three key insights from the social science deserve mention here.  
First, these threats are environmentally contingent.19  In other words, 
they arise not from some individual vulnerability inherent to a 
person, but rather because that person finds herself in an 
environment that signals that her success might be negatively 
implicated because of an identity she holds.20 
Second, numbers matter.  Or more precisely, institutional 
demographics—particularly along socially salient categories such as 
race and gender—comprise one powerful cue that can either 
exacerbate or ameliorate the likelihood of threat.21  When individuals 
 
following the passage of Proposition 209, which effectively ended affirmative 
action in California); see also Deirdre M. Bowen, Brilliant Disguise: An Empirical 
Analysis of a Social Experiment Banning Affirmative Action, 85 IND. L.J. 1197, 
1199 (2010) (observing that “[u]nderrepresented minority students in states that 
permit affirmative action encounter far less hostility and internal and external 
stigma than students in anti-affirmative action states.”). 
 17. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Ingroup Experts and Peers as Social Vaccines Who 
Inoculate the Self-Concept: The Stereotype Inoculation Model, 22 PSYCHOL. 
INQUIRY 231, 232 (2011) (“Stereotype threat and social identity threat are known 
to undermine performance in domains where one’s group is negatively 
stereotyped and one’s belonging uncertain; over time, weak performance reduces 
self-confidence in one’s ability (or self-efficacy) and leads individuals to withdraw 
from the domain.”).  
 18. See, e.g., id.; David S. Yeager et al., Teaching a Lay Theory Before College 
Narrows Achievement Gaps at Scale, 113 (24) PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E3341, 
E3347 (2016); Mary C. Murphy et al., Signaling Threat: How Situational Cues 
Affect Women in Math, Science, and Engineering Settings, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 879, 
879 (2007); Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the 
Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995). 
 19. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 18, at 879–80 (“[W]e contend that a person’s 
vulnerability to identity threat need not be inherent to him or her. Instead, 
situational cues may contribute to experiences of social identity threat among 
groups potentially stereotyped in a setting—even when targets are interested, 
confident, proven achievers in the relevant domain.”). 
 20. See id. 
 21. See, e.g., Valerie Purdie-Vaughns et al., Social Identity Contingencies: 
How Diversity Cues Signal Threat or Safety for African Americans in Mainstream 
Institutions, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 615, 615–18 (2008) (describing 
how visible underrepresentation can produce identity contingencies and 
compromise institutional trust); Michael Inzlicht & Talia Ben-Zeev, A 
Threatening Intellectual Environment: Why Females Are Susceptible to 
Experiencing Problem-Solving Deficits in the Presence of Males, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
365, 370 (2000) (“The data from the current study support the conclusion that the 
presence of males constitutes a threatening intellectual environment for females 
performing a math task, and specifically that women experience a greater deficit 
in their math performance the more males there are in the environment.”). 
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are visibly underrepresented in a particular domain, that 
underrepresentation can itself signal that a person is not part of the 
ingroup and may be judged through lenses warped by stereotypes.22 
Third, these psychological threats do not merely reside within a 
person’s head.  Hundreds of laboratory and real world studies have 
shown that they exact concrete and quantifiable consequences.23  
When present, social identity threat and stereotype threat can 
compromise an individual’s ability to learn, decrease rates of 
academic and social engagement, and undermine academic 
performance—even when a person is otherwise highly motivated and 
prepared.24  In summary, and consistent with Harvard’s diagnosis, 
there is a discernable link between “numbers and providing a 
reasonable environment for those students admitted.”25 
VI.  BEYOND THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CANON 
The social science offers a robust empirical foundation for 
Harvard’s observations concerning the relationship between racial 
diversity and equal university membership.  But to fully appreciate 
the normative and doctrinal appeal of diversity as a driver of equality, 
it is helpful to return to the case law.  I refer specifically to the 
Supreme Court’s pre-Brown v. Board of Education desegregation 
jurisprudence—an area of case law that too infrequently enters 
contemporary conversations about diversity, affirmative action, and 
equal protection. 
On the same day in 1950, the Supreme Court struck down 
segregatory regimes in higher education in Oklahoma and Texas.26  
The Oklahoma decision featured George McLaurin, an African 
American man who, following years of litigation, had won his right to 
attend the University of Oklahoma Graduate School of Education.  
Yet even after admission, McLaurin remained subject to race-based 
conditions.  As described by the Court: 
[McLaurin was] assigned to a seat in the classroom in a row 
specified for colored students; . . . assigned to a table in the 
library on the main floor; and . . . permitted to eat at the same 
time in the cafeteria as other students, although here again he 
is assigned to a special table.27 
McLaurin argued that these conditions violated his right to equal 
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The university, in 
 
 22. See id. 
 23. See Murphy, supra note 18, at 879; Yeager et al., supra note 18, at E3342 
fig.1. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 323 (1978). 
 26. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).  For a more extended discussion of 
McLaurin and Sweatt, see Feingold, supra note 12. 
 27. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640. The restrictions evolved over the course of 
the litigation.  See id. 
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response, defended the conditions on the basis that they imposed, at 
most, a nominal burden on McLaurin.28  
The Supreme Court agreed that, in certain respects, the 
restrictions were limited.29  Nonetheless, in a unanimous decision 
authored by Justice Vinson, the Supreme Court determined that the 
conditions rendered McLaurin’s education “unequal to that of his 
classmates” and thereby violated his “personal and present right to 
the equal protection of the laws.”30  Justice Vinson explained that the 
restrictions “impair[ed] and inhibit[ed] his ability to study, to engage 
in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in 
general, to learn his profession.”31  They also “signif[ied] that the 
State, in administering the facilities it affords for professional and 
graduate study, set[] McLaurin apart from the other students.”32  In 
short, the conditions proved constitutionally infirm because they 
deprived McLaurin an education equal to his white peers.33  
Translated to the contemporary context, McLaurin reinforces the 
appeal of a diversity rationale that centers the personal equality 
interests of students of color.34  At its core, this decision reminds us 
that basic equality concerns arise when institutional conditions 
deprive certain students, because of their race, the full benefits of 
university membership.35  Racial diversity, in turn, counters such 
conditions by inscribing into the environmental landscape the 
implicit message that all students belong, are valued, and will 
succeed.  Understood in this sense, racial diversity is integral to 
higher education because it comprises one piece of a broader 
institutional prerogative to ensure that all students, regardless of 
their race, have an equal opportunity to enjoy the full benefits of 
university membership.  
 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 640–41. 
 30. Id. at 642. 
 31. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
34. It is true that McLaurin offers an imperfect analogy; formal policies that 
segregate students by race are unlikely to arise in 2019.  Nonetheless, McLaurin 
offers a valuable precedential anchor to contemporary debates about diversity 
and the merits of affirmative action. 
 35. Id. at 641–42. 
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